

Judeo-Bolshevism? Hanebrink objects to this way of analysis because it imposes rigid ethnic categories upon people of Jewish descent who did not always identify as Jewish. Indeed, scholars should refrain from such ontological simplicity. Notwithstanding this, by disregarding the Jewish background of some important Communist leaders, Hanebrink inadvertently fails to consider an important question: what and who defined Jewishness in the complex region of Central and Eastern Europe?

Hanebrink's engaged scholarship is a final issue: That right-wing activists and nationalist politicians still use the Judeo-Bolshevist myth rightly concerns Hanebrink. Likewise the structural similarities between Judeo-Bolshevism and anti-Muslim sentiments are striking. Nevertheless, is it justified to see anti-Muslim sentiments as a new incarnation of the Judeo-Bolshevist myth? This might just stretch his analysis beyond the limits of what a comparative method allows: Communist regimes throughout the twentieth century were not Jewish; terror groups, such as ISIS and Al-Qaida are in fact Islamic.

These caveats notwithstanding, Hanebrink's study represents an important opening: it will help to shape future studies about Judeo-Bolshevism. Likewise, it can serve as a teaching aid in University seminars. Because it is written accessibly, it can also inspire debate beyond the confines of academia.

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Keir Giles, *Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West*. London: Chatham House, 2019.

After a period of uncertainty, economic instability, and socio-political disarray associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, has transformed into an increasingly assertive, if not aggressive at times, foreign policy actor. This transformation often seems to puzzle world leaders and governments as illogical and odd. *Moscow Rules*

demonstrates with painstaking clarity, why this transformation is neither new, nor surprising given Russia's history of relations with the outside world and its self-perception as a great power.

Keir Giles has crafted a sobering account of Russia's collective identity and behavior based on his thirty years of close observation and research of Russia. Giles dissects Russia's historical and contemporary behavior as a state down to its core and uncovers the perpetual need to be acknowledged a great power by other international actors, to be seen as an equal by the collective West, and to challenge all other great power contenders. State security, sovereignty, and territoriality are at the core of Russian insecurities, which have always driven and still drive the country's past and present leaders to expand continuously and address apparent and imagined external threats. Giles carefully avoids judgement and does not attempt excusing Russia. Instead, he invites the Western reader to try to understand Russia's place in the world, internal system, values and history, as well as prospects for change through the prism of Russian history.

In the first part of the book, Giles tears apart the usual academic preconceptions about Russia and explains why the analysis of Russia needs to be free of Eurocentric preconceptions. Russia's key difference from any other European country is its strong historical self-perception as one of two or three great powers in the world. This self-perception not only informs its foreign policy, but also shapes how Russia perceives other countries' policies towards it. More often than not, Russia sees threats and attempts to undermine its great power status. This is something Western governments do not regularly take into account when dealing with Russia. Giles explores Russia's uneasy relationship with the West through the prism of the tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union, and contemporary Russia. What he discovers is the consistency of foreign policy behavior on Russia's side and a surprising wishful thinking on the Western side that Russia would eventually turn into a liberal European nation.

The second part explores the formation and the workings of Russia's internal system, namely, its governance, and the relationship between the individual and the state. In his historical

analysis, Giles goes as deep as into the Mongol rule period to show the formation of the fundamental principles of relations between the individual and the state: submission to the state, compulsory state service of all individuals, and autocracy. Giles analyzes how these deep-seated principles have transformed and adapted to the contemporary conditions but have not gone away. In this regard, the leadership of Putin is not a historical anomaly. Instead, Putin's policies are consistent with Russia's core identity, behavior, and values.

The third part addresses the roots of these behavior and values as it examines Russia's moral framework and history. The reign of state-imposed atheism in the Soviet period might have blurred the importance of Orthodox Christianity for external observers. With the fall of the communist ideology, Russia turned to its centuries-old triumvirate of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. The Church in Russia is intertwined with the state, but in a manner that fundamentally differs from its Western counterparts. The Church serves the state and supports and legitimizes secular authority. It also provides some of the ingrained ideas of Russia's place in the world, which might inform both domestic perceptions of Russia and foreign policy decision making. The idea of Russia as the Third Rome, the legitimate successor and protector of true Christianity, might seem archaic, but it informs and fuels Russia's self-perception as a great power and an opponent to the decadent West.

Finally, Giles looks into Russia's prospects for change and analyzes its public protest potential. Throughout Russian history, the balance of interests between the state and the public has almost always been in favor of the state. Partly, this was possible due to the ingrained acceptance that the state takes precedence over everything else. It is the ever-changing balance of public patience, resilience, and anger that would shape the possibilities for protest.

This is not a conventional academic publication, and it might seem somewhat controversial for certain audiences, who may be used to viewing Russia outside of its historical context. Keir Giles shares an almost intimate familiarity with Russia's society with the

reader. He offers an in-depth exploration of internal philosophical debates on Russia's national myths, aspirations, and public perceptions, which are often inaccessible to the non-Russian speaking audience. This book would be an excellent guide for anyone who wishes to get a better and more nuanced understanding of Russia for academic, professional, or personal purposes.

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Anna A. Velikaya and Greg Simons (eds.), *Russia's Public Diplomacy: Evolution and Practice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 (and Georgia in 2008), the realities of the new world (dis)order triggered a global debate on "hybrid warfare," with its key mechanisms and instruments of "hard power" and "soft power" (re)balancing into "smart power" integrity. Experts and analysts have focused in particular (and have tended to over-estimate the importance of) the Kremlin's so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine." Meanwhile, public diplomacy, which has become a quite significant geostrategic issue for Russia as well, has generally not received the serious attention that it deserves.

This book not only contributes to the debates on "soft power," but also goes some way towards filling the gap in the scholarship on "smart power." The contributors raise several important issues that merit ongoing consideration. Those issues are not only conceptual but, first and foremost, empirical.

The book's contributors, who come from a range of different countries and fields, analyze the history and practice of Russia's public diplomacy, with the aim of portraying the achievements, struggles, frustrations, and highlights of the crucial "soft power" mechanism. They also try to evaluate how the public diplomacy elements of "smart power" might be used effectively in order to support the Kremlin's "geostrategy of revenge" policies, both internally and externally.