

Important countries that influenced Russian foreign relations after communism like the United Kingdom, Germany, or Israel are hardly mentioned. Many crucial developments are not systematically discussed; these include the role of the secret services and of active measures, the use of military force and frozen conflicts, the politics of history, the concept of “sovereignty” for the Russian elite and, perhaps most crucially, the connection between internal repression and aggressive foreign policy under Putin as well as in the USSR.

JAN CLAAS BEHRENDIS

Leibniz-Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF)  
and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino–Soviet Competition for the Third World*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2019.

You could say that I was born into the Sino–Soviet split. My grandfather Agey Gatov spent almost two decades in war-torn China, first as an adviser to the Kuomintang and later the Communist Party; by the mid-1950s he had established himself as one of the key experts on the internal divisions within the CPC (he personally knew not only all the “marshals of the Revolution” but almost the entire Beijing leadership). Growing up in my Sinologist grandfather’s household, I learned about Mao, Deng, Wan Min, Gao Gan, and Chzhou Enlai not from obscure Soviet mass propaganda but from people who knew them personally and—were literally on the frontline of the “Shadow Cold War.”

Whilst reading Prof. Friedman’s book, I could not escape these childhood recollections: it is not just the familiarity of the plot and narrative arc, but also some very particular ideological emphases that we tend to overlook today. The sudden resurgence of words such as “revisionists,” “maoists,” “pseudo-revolutionaries,” “opportunists” somehow takes one back into the strange world of the 1960s–1970s.

*Shadow Cold War* offers a thorough timeline of events from 1950 to the late 1980s when Gorbachev was in power and when both countries ceased their ideological rivalry and forged better relations, based on pragmatism and cooperation. Friedman provides a wealth of details, documents, and research interviews with officials on both sides, all an asset for academics and students of this period. Many sources have never before been translated into English—from Chinese Foreign Ministry wires, to various deeply ideological Soviet critiques of Mao's nationalist interpretation of revolutionary practice. The very thing that makes Friedman's book unique is what makes it open to criticism: its concentration on the ideological and diplomatic aspects of the split.

Friedman provides detailed (even excessive, in my view) analysis of the Sino-Soviet ideological split, which he derives from the fundamental differences between the natures of the Russian and Chinese. He delves into an analysis of the notoriously absurd mutual accusations of revisionism and divergence from true Marxist-Leninist theory, which the Kremlin and Beijing publicly exchanged between 1957 and 1976. It should be noted that Friedman actually took seriously (as a good historian should) the words of ultra-dogmatic Soviet party ideologue Mikhail Suslov as well as any number of works by Soviet and Chinese party historians. Friedman writes that he decided to concentrate on this ideological and foreign policy analysis rather than on the personal animosity between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, or on Soviet military concerns about the rapid growth of PLA capabilities, or even the tragic history of Soviet espionage in China (the later subject is also under-researched). This choice of focus seems justified since most works on the Sino-Soviet ideological split were produced in the 1970s and early 1980s when even respected authors were somewhat blindsided by questions regarding the real and imagined insecurity of the USSR's eastern border and by Chinese claims on Soviet lands. The ideological split grew, as Friedman describes at length, from the inevitable division between Russian Communists and Mao Zedong on the critical issue of nationalism. Just as the Russian revolution was and remained international and anti-nationalist (despite Stalin's ideological corrections), China's—and particularly Mao's—

underlying revolutionary ideology was nationalist, anti-imperial, and anti-colonial. Friedman sides with Mao Zedong identifying Soviet revolutionary theory as imperialist by nature; he underlines that for the Chinese leader, the revolution was “nation re-building,” the path to restoring China’s greatness and securing its independence after centuries of colonial humiliation.

Friedman’s well-written and well-thought through analysis of the dogmatic differences between Moscow and Beijing makes the origins of the split only slightly more comprehensible than issues of the Great Schism in Christianity described through a “filioque” clause. Fortunately, after 50-plus pages of quasi-theological debate he gives up and moves on to the vastly more interesting infighting between the sister Communist parties for global dominance and future ideological victory (or defeat, to be exact). This part of the book describes—in meticulous detail—how Moscow and Beijing fought over the hearts, minds, and purses of a number of Third World countries. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 are once again treasure troves of rare documents, memoirs, and interviews with invaluable insights for scholars of different affiliations, including those whose focus is far from Russian and Chinese political history. Beijing’s attempts to undermine Soviet domination of the post-colonial African and Arabic worlds, tales of corruption and economic errors correspond with natural tragedies of nations and people who happen to deal with the Shadow Cold War.

The book is chronological, following the political and economic developments of the Sino-Soviet split to direct conflict between the two countries (the so-called “Damansky” incident), and the later “ice-cold period” up until Mao’s death in 1976. Although this later period has much more “live” action—particularly in Africa, Latin America and even in China’s underbelly (Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar and Cambodia), Friedman rushes through it faster than he does the earlier decades. Agreed, the Soviet Union had become much more “static” after 1968 as its gradual economic growth was finally in a position to resolve the competition with China over influence in the Third World. The US-Chinese rapprochement of 1972 in the Shadow Cold War completes a clear connection with the real Cold War—although Friedman follows the

traditional path of judging the Nixon-Kissinger initiative as a success story, giving them both credit for this monumental shift in global relations.

*Shadow Cold War* is a useful and enjoyable book, and even though it fails to pay sufficient attention to the intelligence/espionage angle of the Split, or to concerns over China's nuclear program and, most notably, to Soviet military fears of potential war in the East, these omissions do not detract from its strong historical research and a treasure chest of rare archive material.

VASILY V. GATOV

University of Southern California  
Annenberg School of Communications and Journalism

Paul Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism*. Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018.

The idea that Communism represented a Jewish conspiracy was one of the deadliest of the twentieth century: it fueled hatred, incited pogroms, and formed the backbone for Nazi anti-Semitic ideology. The idea still resonates in our time and age: nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe use it to promote their policies and demonize those whom they perceive as enemies of their nation. One only has to think of the claim that investor-turned-philanthropist George Soros, who happens to have a Jewish background, undermines Hungarian and Polish sovereignty. Likewise, right-wing extremists throughout the Western world harbor anti-Semitic and Judeo-Bolshevik sentiments and use catchcries such as “*Jew will not replace us.*” Much like Communism supposedly represented an “Asiatic” and “Jewish” threat to the “West,” structurally similar ideas fuel anti-Muslim rhetoric today.

In his book, Paul Hanebrink does not study Judeo-Bolshevism as an incarnation of the (medieval) myth of Jews subverting Christian societies. Instead, he stresses that Judeo-Bolshevism served as a marker of identity, and he asks: how did the idea