Introduction: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and European Fascism During World War II*  

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This is the third instalment in an ongoing series of thematic JSPPS sections dedicated to the memory and history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukr. abbrev.: UPA). We are all too aware that it is a simplification to use the terms OUN and UPA without explaining further which exact organizations are actually meant. Using these terms as shorthand may lead the informed reader to ask: when we refer to the OUN, do we mean the OUN(b), the faction led by Stepan Bandera, or the OUN(m), the faction led by Andriy Melnyk, or even the OUN(z), i.e. “za kordonom” (abroad), formed after a split within Bandera’s post-war so-called “ZCh [Zakordonni chastyny] OUN” (Foreign Parts of the OUN)? Likewise, when we talk about the UPA,

* Kai Struve, Yuri Radchenko, Tomislav Dulić, Goran Miljan, Leonid Luks, and Per Anders Rudling provided feedback on a first draft of this introduction. About a dozen historians wrote useful anonymous reviews on the below three papers. Marian Luschnat kindly translated Radchenko’s article from Ukrainian into English. We are also very grateful to Julie Fedor for her extremely careful and patient final editing of the contributions to the three special sections published thus far (including this introduction). Umland’s work for this special section has benefited from support by “Accommodation of Regional Diversity in Ukraine (ARDU): A research project funded by the Research Council of Norway (NORRUSS Plus Programme).” See: blogg.hioa.no/ardu/category/about-the-project/ (accessed 26 January 2020). Responsibility for any remaining imprecisions and misinterpretations here and below lies, however, solely with the respective texts’ authors.

The next instalment will be published in 2021. Proposals for further special sections for the subseries “Issues in the History and Memory of the OUN” are welcome. These should take the form of a set of abstracts and notes on contributors, and can be emailed to the journal’s General Editor (details at www.jspps.eu).
are we referring to the UPA directed by the OUN(b) leadership, or to the lesser known UPA led by Taras Bul'ba-Borovets’?2

Discussions of war-time nationalism often use summarily and indiscriminately the label “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” —as we do in the title of our subseries. There is also widespread simplified use of the construct “OUN-UPA” although there was no such fully united structure. Yet, in many commemorative practices and discourses the various organizations linked to these labels are often presented as being indistinguishable or even as one and the same. While this may be analytically dubious, it has become common practice by now. Arguably, in spite of its denotational elusiveness, this is a legitimate terminological shortcut facilitating more concise and broad communication that avoids repetition of tiresome specifications.

For similar reasons, throughout this subseries we too have employed the generic terms OUN and UPA without always indicating which exact organizations we have in mind. It should be clear though that, if not indicated otherwise, we mainly refer here to the history and memory of the OUN(b) as well as to the UPA connected to the OUN(b). The contributors to our subseries present more sophisticated and specialized discussions focused on specific organizations. The idea of this JSPPS subseries was, among others, precisely to discuss different organizations and to highlight the specificity of certain groups that, for the “common reader,” are often lumped together under the simplified umbrella label “OUN-UPA.”3

Our guest-edited English-language sections in JSPPS run in parallel to a multi-author Russian-language project in Germany with

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3 The combined name OUN-UPA is often solely linked to Soviet propaganda narratives on Ukrainian nationalism. However, the construct has, in fact, also been used by more sympathetic and anti-Soviet observers in the past and present (including in our previous thematic sections in JSPPS). Communication with Per Anders Rudling, 11 February 2020.
which we are also involved. This Russian collection consists of articles translated from Ukrainian, English, Polish, and German. To date it has comprised four special sections on the OUN and UPA published in issues 26–29 of the Bavaria-based web-journal Forum for Contemporary East European History and Culture, and includes papers by, among others, Yana Prymachenko, Olena Petrenko, Timothy D. Snyder, Yaroslav Hrytsak, John-Paul Himka, Myroslav Shkandrij, Grzegorz Motyka, Oleksandr Zaitsev, Heorhii Kas’ianov, Per Anders Rudling, and others—some of them also contributors to the present English-language series.

This foreword is our third JSPPS preface on this topic, and provides an extensive bibliographical update. It does not repeat what was already outlined in the introductions to the previous instalments, both freely available in full online. The references provided in the two previous introductions and ten articles

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published in the subseries to date list most of the older relevant scholarly literature. In the footnotes for this preface, we provide details for a whole new set of additional secondary sources related, in one way or another, to the 2019 changes in Ukrainian memory politics, and to the particular sub-themes of the present special section.

The first two special sections focused on some contentious issues in the history and memory of the OUN and UPA and their comparatively informed interpretation. They tackled questions

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related to the historical, political, sociological, and ethical assessment of these organizations, and the contemporary use of their history against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014.9 This section has similar general foci, yet deals in more detail—though, by no means, exhaustively!—with a particular subset of controversial topics in the history of the OUN and UPA, as well as issues surrounding their legacy for present day Ukraine, already touched upon by, among others, Igor Barinov in previous instalments.10 These articles provide additional observations and perspectives on both OUN(b) and OUN(m), and their complicated relationships to war-time fascism, in general, and German Nazism, in particular, as well as on the relation of the OUN’s ideology to the participation of some of its members in the Holocaust.11

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Ukraine’s Changing Historical-Political Landscape in 2019

Before turning to introduce the three articles, it is worth mentioning some changes in Ukrainian memory affairs that happened between late 2018, when the second part in this series was published, and early 2020, as we complete the third part. As noted in our first introduction, the Euromaidan revolution from November 2013 to February 2014 became a catalyst for a governmental institutionalization and social mainstreaming of a type of history politics that promoted a heroic and partly even hagiographic commemoration of war-time ultra-nationalism in Ukraine—in particular of the OUN and its leaders. The “decommunization” laws adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in April 2015 can be seen as marking a turning point in Ukraine’s peculiar Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coping with the past”). That is because one of these laws grants a special status to the OUN–UPA as “freedom fighters.” It officially protects the two organizations from derogation and condemnation in the public sphere.

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The war in the Donbas, moreover, strengthened popular sentiments in favor of seeing the OUN(b) and its military arm UPA as exclusively liberationist organizations. In some media and official representations, the soldiers of the current Ukrainian army are compared or even equated to the fighters of the OUN and UPA. One expression of this tendency was the creation of an official “Day of the Defender of the Motherland” on 14 October—a date which is also celebrated as the “Day of Cossackdom” and the “Day of the UPA.” A more or less “heroic” approach to the memory of the OUN–UPA was supported by most branches of Ukraine’s government, during the period of 2014–2019, including then President Petro Poroshenko himself.

Since spring 2019, with the election of a new president, Volodymyr Zelens’kyy, a Russophone Ukrainian with Jewish family origins, a radical redirection of Ukrainian memory policies has been widely anticipated. By early 2020, as we complete this special section, some tentative contours of the new course are already discernible. For instance, Zelens’kyy’s New Year Eve’s speech, on 31 December 2019, indicated an intention to distance himself from the often explicitly nationalist approach to memory affairs practised by the previous government, as well as its promotion of some domestically and internationally controversial national heroes. Zelens’kyy declared his desire for Ukraine to be a country where it is “not important what the street’s called, because it has street lights and it’s paved,” and “it’s not important under which monument you rendezvous with your sweetheart.” This indicates that we may see a shift in the official memory politics, whereby campaigns aimed at

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15 The tradition of broadcasting New Year Eve’s addresses by state leaders was established in the Soviet Union during Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership in the 1970s. This tradition continues today both in Russia and Ukraine.

memorializing and celebrating Stepan Bandera and other nationalist “freedom fighters” may again become a regional rather than national phenomenon, as they mostly had been before 2014.17

Recent personnel changes at the governmental Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (Ukr. abbrev.: UINP) also give clues on what to expect in memory politics in 2020–2024.18 On 4

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December 2019, 33-year-old Anton Drobovych was appointed as the UINP’s new director. Like his predecessors in this office, Drobovych is not a widely acknowledged and quoted participant of international scholarly debates within academic Ukrainian historical or memory studies. For better or worse, he does not appear in recognized scientific citation indices such as those of Scopus Elsevier or the Web of Science.

Prior to his appointment, he had worked at the National Pedagogical Drahomanov University of Kyiv and for the “Babyn Yar” Holocaust Memorial Center. Drobovych stated that under his leadership the UINP would “continue a search for heroic personalities but with an emphasis on personalities who will unite Ukrainian society and who will finally help us to come to terms with who these personalities are.” As examples of such personalities, Drobovych named avant-garde artist Kazimir Malevich as well as famous football player and coach Valery Lobanovskiyi.

At the same time, Drobovych stated that the UINP would continue to work on decommunization and on such topics as the Holodomor, the Holocaust, and the Chornobyl catastrophe, and to fight against historical myths. He promised to pay special attention to cooperation with neighboring countries, and establishing common ground with them—a thinly veiled reference, above all, to the deeply spoiled relations with Poland. In the event, however, in winter 2019–2020, the UINP published “memorial” posts on its Facebook page related not only to Lobanovskiyi or to the dissident poet Vasyl’ Stus, i.e. two uncontroversial if very different figures, but also to Stepan Bandera. This could indicate a trend towards

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continuity rather than rupture in future Ukrainian official memory affairs.

Overall, Zelens’kyy’s history policies do not seem to be moving back to approaches once promoted under pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych and his formerly communist UINP director Valeriy Soldatenko, during 2010–2014. Instead, Ukraine’s new leadership apparently wants to preserve some earlier established fundamentals while distancing itself from some particularly controversial issues in World War II history that were prominent in Kyiv’s official commemoration line under President Poroshenko. That goes especially for the memory politics of the 2014–2019 UINP director Volodymyr V’iatrovych, and his undisguisedly hagiographic approach to the ideas, leaders, and record of the war-time OUN(b).

V’iatrovych’s apologetic position on the memory of war-time Ukrainian ultra-nationalism should not come as a surprise, given that his main non-governmental affiliation is the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement in L’viv. In the words of a contemporary OUN(b) representative:

The Organization [of Ukrainian Nationalists] is today a global (world-wide) closed structure, and much of the [work] done remains unannounced [...]. At the same time, a large segment of [its] activity is known thanks to various façade structures [zavdiaki riznym fasadnym strukturam] founded by the OUN: from political [...] to academic [ones, like] the “Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement” [...] 22

The Ukrainian new leadership’s emphases are, perhaps, not only and not so much related to any particular ideological preferences, or to substantive political differences with the early

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22 Sviatoslav Lypovets’kyi, Orhanizatsiia ukrainskich natsionalistiv (banderivtsi): fragmenty diial’nosti ta borot’by (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka Vydavnycha Spil’ka, 2010), 84. As quoted in: Rudling, “Yushchenko’s Fascist,” 159. It is worrisome, Rudling also notes (ibid.), that as manifestly a partisan organization as the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement has been given control over the National Memory Policy Experts Group within Ukraine’s major and otherwise reputable NGO umbrella organization “Reanimation Package of Reforms.” See: http://rpr.org.ua/en/groups-rpr/17policy-of-national-memory/ (accessed 16 April 2018).
post-Euromaidan leadership. Rather, they are motivated by a desire to reverse some of the ramifications that the 2014–2019 activities of the UINP and its director had for Ukrainian domestic as well as foreign affairs. The damage caused was especially visible with regard to the frustrating deterioration of Kyiv’s relations with Warsaw over diverging interpretations of the Ukrainian massacre of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–44.

V’iatrovych’s partisan writings and public activities had stirred controversy already before he assumed directorship of the UINP. During his term as UINP head, they became the subject of a

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23 To be sure, V’iatrovych was and is by far not the only prolific apologetic writer on the OUN. See, for instance, recently: Olesia Isaiuk, Roman Shukhevych (Kharkiv: Klub simeinoho dozvillia, 2015); Mykola Posivnych, Stepan Bandera (Kharkiv: Klub simeinoho dozvillia, 2015); Vakhtang Kipiani (ed.), “Zrodylys’ my velykoi hodyny....” OUN i UPA (Kharkiv: Vivat, 2016); Petro Kononenko, Ukraintsi u svitoviy tsyvylizatsii i kul’tury: Istorychnyy fenomen Stepana Bandery (Ternopil’: Dzhura, 2016); Oleh Stetsyshyn, Banderivs’kyy internatsional: Gruziny, rosiiany, evrei… (L’viv: Chasopys, 2015); and Maksym Maiorov, Volodymyr V’iatrovych, and Oleksandr Zinchenko (eds.), Viyna i mif: Nevidoma Druha svitova (Kharkiv: Klub simeinoho dozvillia, 2016). Apart from the enormous book production by nationalist apologetic publicists, there is now also a smaller para-academic ultra-nationalist literature collected by the right-radical party All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom). See, for example: Tetiana Boiko, Bohdan Halaiiko, and Iurii Syrotiuk (eds.), Treti Banderivs’ki chytannia: Vizii Ukrain’skoj derzhavy v ideoloohii ukrain’koho natsionalizmu (Kyiv – Ivano-Frankiv’s’k: Misto NV, 2016); idem (eds.), Misii Ukrainy ta natsional’ni interesy v hlobalizovanomu sviti: Vizii natsionalistiv. Zbirnyk materialiv P’iatykh Banderivs’kykh chytan’ (Kyiv – L’viv: USSR/Astrolibiia, 2018).


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growing body of media commentary, public protests, and academic debate, by both Western and Ukrainian observers. In particular, V’iatrovych’s frequent public praise for the famous OUN(b) leader, UPA commander, and “Schutzmann” Roman Shukhevych triggered

repeated bouts of irritation in Poland. While Ukraine’s post-2019 memory policies may still continue evolving along the general lines of decommunization, they will now seemingly depart from V’iatrovych’s provocative approach. This could mean that Kyiv will, at least until the next regular presidential elections in 2024, focus on topics less controversial both inside Ukraine and in its relations with neighboring countries as well as with further relevant partners, such as Berlin and Tel Aviv.

Three Interpretative Contexts for OUN War-Time Behavior

In this special section, we have collected three research papers written by four historians from, in this order, Germany, Ukraine, and Sweden. The first two articles tackle different factions and aspects of the OUN, while the third article considers the OUN only indirectly, by way of comparison to the Croatian Ustaša case. All three articles contribute to an older and broader discussion over how to locate the OUN within the contexts of interwar and World War II world history, on the one hand, and contemporary East European history, on the other. Namely, they touch upon the

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debate over whether the OUN’s two factions can or even should, at least with regard to their record during World War II, be labeled as “fascist” or not.\textsuperscript{30} The articles presented here set out to make historically grounded and comparatively informed contributions to this debate.

The first two papers deal with empirical aspects of the behavior of the OUN’s Bandera and Melnyk factions during World War II. In particular, they highlight the degree, depth, length, and shifting nature of their collaboration with the Nazis. They are especially revealing concerning the complicated issue of the degree to which some OUN members’ active participation in the Holocaust was related to German inspiration or rather to indigenous Ukrainian anti-Semitism. The third article does not directly deal with the

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OUN itself, but provides an extensive discussion of issues of interpretation and conceptualization of the main war-time ultra-nationalist organization that is comparable to the OUN—the Ustaša.

Kai Struve (University of Halle-Wittenberg), in his article, summarizes the findings of his, by now, widely recognized, if not already seminal monograph *German Rule, Ukrainian Nationalism, Anti-Jewish Violence* published in 2015.\(^{34}\) The particular novelty and value of this German book and of the below English article, summarizing its findings on the role of the OUN in anti-Jewish violence, is that Struve not only meticulously details, but also carefully differentiates between various types, contexts, and motivations of anti-Jewish violence and its perpetrators in Eastern Galicia in summer 1941.\(^{35}\) His findings show, above all, that the Holocaust can be seen to have started already from the first days of the German-Soviet war in 1941, in so far as numerous Ukrainian Jews were immediately executed, on the spot, by various units of the German police, most importantly Einsatzgruppe C, and in some localities also fell victim to extremely violent attacks by units of the Waffen-SS.

Yet, anti-Semitic crimes were also early on—even if to relatively smaller degree—committed by Germany’s various allies, including a number of irregular armed units of the OUN(b), as part of their local seizure of power. Struve’s observation appears as an addition to, or even correction of, a competing thesis that the

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rapidly growing local anti-Semitic violence in former Eastern Poland during that period represented a massive outburst of popular hatred against Jews emerging from among the region’s general population—whether Polish, Ukrainian, or other. In contrast, his evidence rather seems to suggest that such crimes were also the results of organized and not only spontaneous East European ultranationalism.36

Struve’s intriguing findings also illustrate that the partnership between the Germans and the OUN(b) was, already from the start of the war in summer 1941, more ambivalent and unstable than suggested in the simplified image painted by Soviet and post-Soviet anti-nationalist propaganda about Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. Initially there was indeed far-reaching cooperation between the Wehrmacht, and OUN(b), during summer 1941. The alliance, however, quickly became dubious when the Germans and OUN(b) leadership came into manifest political conflict about the future of the occupied Ukrainian lands, less than two weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, even after the Germans’ arrest of some prominent OUN(b) leaders in early July 1941, most of the Organization’s irregular armed groups continued their activities on the territory of Soviet Ukraine under Nazi rule. A whole number of OUN(b) members committed grave crimes against Jews and sometimes murdered them collectively—even though, one cannot repeat enough, on a relatively far smaller scale than did the German Einsatzgruppe C, via mass executions, and Waffen-SS, in more spontaneous actions, during the same time period and in the same geographic area (East Europeans were not yet, on a larger scale, part of the German police or Waffen SS then).37 In doing so, the OUN(b)

militias partially acted, according to Struve, independently.\(^\text{38}\) That means that, on various occasions, they were not following explicit German orders or guidelines.\(^\text{39}\)

Recently, Ukrainian historian Andriy Usach has confirmed Struve’s earlier observation in two intriguing local case studies:

> Even after the start of the [OUN(b)’] conflict with the Nazi occupation administration, [the Ukrainian nationalists] managed to legally operate for some time in rural areas far away from big cities. The fact that in parallel they continued to persecute local Jews implies they were also implementing their own policies not related to the Holocaust policy or trying to win some trust from the Germans to this end. Moreover, none of the available testimonies have any records on the participation or presence of the Nazi occupation administration during mass killings in Smotrych and Kupyn. That is why the events also should be considered in the context of the planned violence against ethnic minorities OUN(b) contrived back in spring 1941.\(^\text{40}\)

This indicates that, among other factors, indigenous Ukrainian anti-Semitism and, above all, the conspirological mythology of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” along with active German instigation and compulsion, may have played a considerable role in shaping and driving the OUN(b) militias’ early murderous behaviour.\(^\text{41}\) (These findings indicate certain parallels with the anti-

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\(^{39}\) See also: Kai Struve, “Tremors in the Shatter-Zone of Empires: Eastern Galicia in Summer 1941,” in: Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (ed.), Borderlands: Ethnicity, Identity and Violence in the Shatter-Zone of Empires (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2013), 463–84. There is a separate and, by now, large body of scholarly literature devoted specifically to the L'viv pogroms of summer 1941 which is not listed here.

\(^{40}\) Andriy Usach, “The ‘Eastern Action’ of the OUN(b) and the Anti-Jewish Violence in the Summer of 1941: The Cases of Smotrych and Kupyn,” Euxeinos: Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region 9, no. 27 (2019): 63–84, here: 80 (grammar left in the original form).

Semitic motivations and murderous behavior of some Poles towards local Jews in the infamous Jedwabne case. This, moreover, happened—albeit on only a few occasions at this point—already during the first weeks of the German-Soviet war. These local crimes thus occurred before the massive “schooling in murder” (Per Anders Rudling) that the various German military, para-military, and auxiliary units undertook with their local collaborators throughout 1941–44.


We are grateful to Leonid Luks for alerting us to this comparative reference.


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Interethnic Relations Research in Eastern Europe, Kharkiv) provides a fascinating biographical account of the surprising turns in the war-time fate of Oleksa Babii, a prominent member of the OUN(m). Radchenko presents evidence indicating that Babii—much like many OUN(b) activists—both collaborated with the Nazis and participated in the Holocaust and was also persecuted and nearly killed by the Germans. Babii was apparently also involved in crimes against the Polish population in Volhynia, and in the arrest of activists of the Melnyk faction’s rival OUN(b).

With the latter detail, Radchenko illustrates that Ukrainian nationalists applied targeted violence not only against various ethnically non-Ukrainian groups perceived to be enemies of the “Ukrainian cause,” as understood by these ultra-nationalists. Both factions of the OUN also murdered ethnic Ukrainians who did not share their ideology, and even sometimes committed crimes against other ultra-nationalists who did not commit to their particular subtype of the OUN’s common far right agenda. While crimes by OUN members against Jews and Poles have, over the past twenty years, become better documented than they used to be, their transgressions against unarmed fellow Ukrainians and co-nationalists remain topics still understudied by scholars. Oddly, this critique also applies to many writings by Ukrainian historians on World War II.

While having largely similar ideologies, the approaches of the OUN’s Bandera and Melnyk factions vis-à-vis the Nazi occupants were, already before Germany’s invasion of the USSR, rather distinct from each other, as has been emphasized by, among others, one of Ukraine’s major academic apologists for the OUN(b): Ivan Patryliak, Dean of the History Faculty of the National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv.44 Struve’s and Radchenko’s papers, in contrast, indicate that the political parallels between the two factions were not limited to their basic common ideas. Instead, one can also detect similarities in the bizarre ambivalence of their interactions with the German occupation powers as well as concerning some of their

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members’ ideologically driven persecution of Jews—and, perhaps, with regard to other aspects not explored in more detail here.

The section’s concluding article by Tomislav Dulić and Goran Miljan (Uppasla University) discusses the Ustaša—Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija (Croatian Revolutionary Organization, UHRO). It is, above all, a case study on how the notion of “abolitionism” may be utilized in comparative fascist studies. While they thus do not directly deal with Ukrainian war-time ultranationalism, Dulić and Miljan touch, in their theoretical considerations, upon many critical issues in the interpretation and classification of the OUN. The two experts on Croatian fascism respond, with their sophisticated empirical-conceptual deliberations, to an argument put forward by the prolific L’viv historian Oleksandr Zaitsev (Ukrainian Catholic University) about the existence of a distinct subtype of historic revolutionary ultranationalism that Zaitsev labels “Ustashism”—with obvious reference to some peculiarities of the UHRO.

According to Zaitsev, “Ustashism” is largely similar to, yet also distinct from, fascism, in that “ustashist” movements are phenomena peculiar to nations that have not yet achieved their own nation-states. Historic Ukrainian “integral nationalism” emerged and operated prior to Ukrainian independence and with the primary aim of achieving it. Thus, the OUN(b) should—in spite of its many similarities with, for instance, Italian Fascism and the Romanian Iron Guard—be seen as an “ustashist” organization that is somewhat distinct from classic fascism while being similar to the Croatian Ustaša and Slovak Hlinka Guard.

44 The word ustaša means “rebel” or, more precisely, “insurgent” thus creating a terminological similarity to Ukrainian war-time nationalism whose main military arm was, as mentioned, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Generally, however, “Ustaša” is used in its original Croatian form for depicting this specific organization. Communication with Tomislav Dulić, 11 February 2020.

In response to Zaitsev, Dulić and Miljan provide a theoretically informed analysis of the UHRO’s evolution, against the background of other anti-systemic organizations. Using Mathiesen’s theory of “the unfinished” for developing a new approach to the comparative analysis of fascism, Dulić and Miljan argue that the Ustaša was not that different from other fascist organizations. As a result, they do not see sufficient grounds to introduce a distinctive novel category like “Ustashism” that could be applied for a better interpretation of the OUN. (In a fourth special section on the OUN forthcoming in JSPPS, we hope to publish Zaitsev’s rebuttal to Dulić’s and Miljan’s rejection of his conceptual innovation.)

Conclusions

Like the two previous JSPPS special sections, the three articles below add new facets to the recent wave of innovative scholarly publications, on the history and commemoration of the OUN. Struve’s and Radchenko’s papers take the empirical study of the wartime development of the OUN’s two factions a step ahead. Dulić’s and Miljan’s paper supports the ongoing integration of descriptive explorations and historic classifications of the OUN into the comparative analysis of war-time European ultra-nationalism, and cross-cultural right-wing extremism studies.

All three papers thus make consequential contributions to the increasingly sophisticated scholarly discussion of the OUN’s ideas and activities before and during World War II, as well as their contemporary interpretation. At the same time, they constitute important expert interventions into the ongoing Ukrainian public debate about the role of the OUN in and for Ukraine’s national history. Last but not least, they are important novel contributions to


47 For a brief survey of some recent literature, see the review article: Jared McBride, “Who Is Afraid of Ukrainian Nationalism?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 17, no. 3 (2016): 647–63.